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Abstract
The Byzantine agreement problem requires a set of n processes to agree on a value sent by a
transmitter, despite a subset of b processes behaving in an arbitrary, i.e. Byzantine, manner and
sending corrupted messages to all processes in the system. It is well known that the problem has
a solution in a (an eventually) synchronous message passing distributed system iff the number
of processes in the Byzantine subset is less than one third of the total number of processes, i.e.
iff n > 3b+ 1. The rest of the processes are expected to be correct: they should never deviate
from the algorithm assigned to them and send corrupted messages. But what if they still do?
We show in this paper that it is possible to solve Byzantine agreement even if, beyond the
b (< n/3) Byzantine processes, some of the other processes also send corrupted messages, as
long as they do not send them to all. More specifically, we generalize the classical Byzantine
model and consider that Byzantine failures might be partial. In each communication step, some
of the processes might send corrupted messages to a subset of the processes. This subset
of processes - to which corrupted messages might be sent - could change over time. We
compute the exact number of processes that can commit such faults, besides those that commit
classical Byzantine failures, while still solving Byzantine agreement. We present a corresponding
Byzantine agreement algorithm and prove its optimality by giving resilience and complexity
bounds.
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1. Introduction
Pease, Shostak and Lamport introduced the Byzantine model in their landmark papers [1,2]. A Byzan-
tine process is defined as a process that can arbitrarily deviate from the algorithm assigned to it and send
corrupted messages to other processes. They considered a synchronous model and proved that agreement
is achievable with a fully connected network if and only if the number of Byzantine processes is less than
one third of the total number of processes. Dolev extended this result to general networks, in which the
connectivity number is more than twice the number of faulty processes [3]. The early work on Byzantine
agreement is well summarized in the survey by Fischer [4].
Several approaches have been proposed to circumvent the impossibility of reaching Byzantine agree-
ment in an asynchronous context [5]. The eventually synchronous model was presented in [6]: an
intermediate model between synchronous and asynchronous models, allowing some limited periods of
asynchrony. Eventual synchrony is considered weak enough to model real systems and strong enough
to make Byzantine agreement solvable. Alternative approaches rely on randomized algorithms [7–10].
As Karlin and Yao showed in [11], the one third bound is still a tight bound for randomized Byzantine
agreement algorithms.
We show in this paper that it is possible to solve Byzantine agreement deterministically even if, beyond
the b (< n/3) Byzantine processes, some of the other processes also send corrupted messages, as long as
they do not send them to all. We show that this is possible deterministically, and even in an eventually
synchronous model. We compute the exact number of processes that can commit such partial Byzantine
faults, besides those that commit classical Byzantine failures, while still solving Byzantine agreement.
For pedagogical purposes, we mainly focus in the main paper on the synchronous context and non-
signed messages [1,12]. We discuss signed messages and the eventually synchronous context in Section
4Resilience Lower Boundssection.4 and the Appendices.
We generalize the classical Byzantine model and consider that Byzantine failures might be partial.
This generalization is, we believe, interesting in its own right. In each communication step, some of the
processes might send corrupted messages to a subset of the processes. The classical Byzantine failure
model corresponds to the extreme case where this subset is the entire system. So we consider a system
of n processes, of which m can be partially faulty. The processes communicate with each other directly
through a complete network. We assume that each partially faulty process p is associated with up to d
(< n−1) Byzantine communication links. Such a process p is said to be d-faulty. The d Byzantine links
are dynamic: they may be different in different communication rounds. A d-faulty process somehow means
that the local computation of the processes remains correct: only the communication links related to the
faulty processes are controlled by the adversary - during specific rounds. This captures practical situations
where processes experience possibly temporary bugs in specific parts of their code or communication
links. From the component failure model’s view, our generalization is orthogonal to those of [13–15].
We establish tight bounds on Byzantine agreement in terms of (a) the number of processes to which
corrupted messages can be sent and (b) time complexity, i.e. the number of rounds needed to reach agree-
ment. Besides basic distributed computing tools like full information protocols and scenario arguments,
we also introduce and make use of a new technique we call “View-Transform” which basically enables
processes to locally correct partial Byzantine failures and transform a classical Byzantine agreement
algorithm into one that tolerates more than 1/3 failures. Interestingly, this transformation only requires
adding a couple more rounds to a classical Byzantine agreement algorithm, i.e., its time complexity
does not grow with the number of partial Byzantine faults tolerated. In fact, by tolerating more than
1/3 Byzantine failures, our algorithm can be faster than classical algorithms in the following sense. In
situation where 1/3 processes are Byzantine, a deterministic Byzantine algorithm [1] need to wait for
all correct processes to communicate, even if some of the communication links between processes have
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very large delays. In our case, these highly delayed links will be viewed as partial failures, and can be
totally tolerated.
For a system with b Byzantine processes and m “d-faulty” processes, Byzantine agreement can be
solved among n processes iff n > max{2m+ d, 2d+m, b}+ 2b. There is thus a clear trade-off between
the number b of Byzantine failures we can tolerate, the number m of partial Byzantine failures and d. For
instance, the system could tolerate 1/6 fraction of “1-faulty” processes in addition to (1/3−) Byzantine
processes. Tolerating fewer classical Byzantine failures would enable us to tolerate many more partial
Byzantine ones. For example, if b = 0, we can tolerate up to n/2 “1-faulty” processes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2Model and Definitionssection.2 describes our par-
tial Byzantine failure model and recalls the Byzantine agreement problem. Section 3The Byzantine Agree-
ment Protocolsection.3 presents our Byzantine agreement algorithm in the synchronous context. Section
4Resilience Lower Boundssection.4 proves the resilience optimality of our algorithm and also discusses
the case where messages are signed. Section 5Time Optimalitysection.5 discusses the time optimality of
the algorithm. We conclude by reviewing related work in Section 6Concluding Remarkssection.6. For
space limitations, we defer the discussion on early decision and eventual synchrony, as well as some
correctness proofs to the optional appendices.
2. Model and Definitions
2.1. Synchronous computations
We first consider a synchronous message passing distributed system P of n processes. Each process
is identified by a unique id p ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}. As in [1,16], a synchronous computation proceeds in
a sequence of rounds.∗ The processes communicate by exchanging messages round by round within a
fully connected point-to-point network. In each round, each process p first sends at most one message to
every other process, possibly to all processes, and then p receives the messages sent by other processes.
The communication channels are authenticated, i.e. the sender is known to the recipient. Following [1],
we consider oral messages† with the following properties: (a) every message sent is delivered; (b) the
absence of a message can be detected. In the system, there is a designated process called transmitter
which has an initial input value from some domain V to transmit to all processes.
We model an algorithm as a set of deterministic automata, one for each process in the system. Thus,
the actions of a process are entirely determined by the algorithm, the initial value of the transmitter and
the messages it receives from others.
2.2. Failure model
In short, a d-faulty process p may lie to other processes: in each round, p can send to a subset of
d processes Byzantine messages, i.e., messages that differ from those that p has to send following its
algorithm. We assume that up to m (> 0) of the processes are partial controlled by the adversary (these
processes can send Byzantine messages to d (< n− 1) processes) and up to b (> 0) are fully controlled
by the adversary. By convention, if m = 0, we assume d = 0 to make our condition simpler to state.
In each round, the adversary chooses up to d communication links from each partial controlled process
that could carry Byzantine messages, while the fully controlled processes could send Byzantine messages.
We call an instance of our system of n processes with m d-faulty processes and b Byzantine processes
as a (n, m, d, b)-system. We refer to the correct processes as well as the d-faulty ones as non-Byzantine
processes in this paper.
∗. We consider eventually synchronous computations in Appendix IVAppendix 2.The Eventually Synchronous Casesection*.6.
†. We discuss the impact of signed messages in Section 4Resilience Lower Boundssection.4.
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2.3. Full information algorithms
We consider full information algorithms in the sense of [1,18,19]. Every process transmits to all
processes its entire state in each round, including everything it knows about all values sent by other
processes in the previous round. We introduce in the following a collection of notations (a slight extension
of [18]) to establish and prove our results.
We use P l:k to denote the set of strings of process identifiers in P of length at least l and at most
k, and P k to denote the set of strings of length k. An empty string has length 0. We use P+ to denote
non-empty strings of symbols in P and P ∗ to denote all strings including the empty one. We always
refer to p0 as the transmitter in the Byzantine agreement problem, and V as the domain of values which
processes wish to agree on. For convenience, we assume that {⊥, 0, 1} ∈ V where ⊥ refers to the empty
value.
A k-round scenario σ (in a (n, m, d, b)-system P ) describes an execution of the algorithm. Intuitively
σ describes a communication scheme admissible for the (n, m, d, b)-system. The scenario is determined
by the initial value of each process and the communication scheme. Given scenario σ, σ(p0p1 . . . pk)
represents the value pk−1 tells pk that pk−2 tells pk−1 ... that p0 tells p1 is p0’s initial value. Formally,
a k-round scenario σ is a mapping σ : p0P 0:k → V , such that:
• σ(p0) is the initial value of transmitter p0.
• There are sets B(σ) and D(σ) of processes (denoting the set of Byzantine and d-faulty processes,
respectively) such that:
– |B(σ)| 6 b and |D(σ)| 6 m,
– for every process p 6∈ (B(σ) ∪D(σ)): σ(wpq) = σ(wp) for all q ∈ P and w ∈ p0P 0:k−2,
– for every process p ∈ D(σ) and round l (6 k), there is a set T of at most d processes such
that for every q ∈ P \ T and every w ∈ p0P l−2 we have σ(wpq) = σ(wp).
Note that σ(wpq) 6= σ(wp) for some strings w of length l and process q means that q receives a Byzantine
message from p in round l + 1.
Throughout this paper, we use σ to represent a k-round scenario for a (n, m, d, b)-system with
transmitter p0, d-faulty processes in D(σ) and Byzantine processes in B(σ). Let σp(s) = σ(sp) for
every s ∈ p0P 0:k−1. σp is called the view of p. Let σq1...qi(s) = σ(sq1 . . . qi) for every s ∈ p0P 0:k−i.
σq1...qi is qi’s view of qi−1’s view ... of q1’s view, or in short qi’s view from q1 . . . qi. Let σp0...pi denote
the (k− i)-round scenario with transmitter pi such that σp0...pi(pis) = σ(p0 . . . pis) for every s ∈ P 0:k−i.
Naturally, σp0...pip denotes the view of p with respect to scenario σp0...pi , and σ
p0...pi
q1...qj denotes the view of
qj from q1 . . . qj with respect to scenario σp0...pi .
Let Uk be the set of mappings from p0P k−1 into V . Any k-round algorithm F defined in a (n, m, d,
b)-system may be defined on the set of all views; namely as a function F : Uk → V .
2.4. The Byzantine agreement problem
We address in this paper the problem of Byzantine agreement (also called the Byzantine generals
problem in [1]). Each process has an output register which records the outcome of the computation. We
assume that the initial value of this register is nil /∈ V and that this output register can be written at most
once.
Let F be a k-round algorithm and the output is a value in V . Then we say that F solves Byzantine
agreement if, for each k-round scenario σ and every process p ∈ P , the following conditions hold:
• Termination: Every non-Byzantine process p outputs value F (σp).
• Validity: If the transmitter p0 is non-Byzantine, then every non-Byzantine process p outputs the
initial value of p0, i.e. F (σp) = σ(p0) if p, p0 6∈ B(σ).
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• Agreement: Any two non-Byzantine processes p and q have the same output, i.e. F (σp) = F (σq) if
p, q 6∈ B(σ).
3. The Byzantine Agreement Protocol
In this section, we present an algorithm we call BA++ (Algorithm 3The Byzantine Agreement Protocolalgocfline.3)
for solving Byzantine agreement within a (n, m, d, b)-system. We adopt the description style of [18] for
our algorithm. The main theorem is as follows.
Theorem 1. BA++ is a (b+3)-round algorithm that solves Byzantine agreement for a (n, m, d, b)-system
if n > max{2m+ d, 2d+m, b}+ 2b.
At a very high level (Figure 1High-level view of Algorithm BA++figure.1), the idea underlying
algorithm BA++ is the following. The processes exchange their messages in a full information manner
during b+ 3 rounds.‡ According to our model, the views obtained at each process contains both partial
failures and Byzantine failures. The first step of BA++ is to correct the partial failures. This is challenging
because the partial faults introduced in the early rounds would still exist in the subsequent rounds. We
address this problem by an algorithm we call View-Transform (Algorithm 2The Byzantine Agreement
Protocolalgocfline.2): this transforms a view with partial failures into a view without partial failures.
Another challenge is to ensure that the views (that resulted from a same scenario) still belong to
a same scenario after View-Transform. This is addressed by iterations of Local-Majority (Algorithm
1The Byzantine Agreement Protocolalgocfline.1). After applying View-Transform to the original view,
the majority algorithm (OM ) of Lamport [1] (or any (b + 1)-round simultaneous Byzantine agreement
algorithm) can be employed to compute a output.
Lemma 1. Suppose n > max{2m + d, 2d + m, b} + 2b. In LM3 (Algorithm 1The Byzantine Agree-
ment Protocolalgocfline.1), if σp0p1...pisp (pipi+1pi+2) = σ
p0p1...pi
s′p′ (pipi+1pi+2) for all pi+1 and pi+2, then
LM3(σ
p0p1...pi
sp ) = LM3(σ
p0p1...pi
s′p′ ). If pi is non-Byzantine, then LM3(σ
p0p1...pi
p ) = σ(p0p1 . . . pi).
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows directly from the algorithm, so we only need to show the
second part.
If m = d = 0 and b = 0, the lemma follows directly since there are no failures. In the following, we
prove the lemma in the case that m 6= 0 or b 6= 0.
If pi+1 is correct, then there are at least n−m−b−1 elements in {σp(p0 . . . pi+1pi+2) : pi+2 ∈ P\pi+1}
equal to σ(p0 . . . pi+1), which implies σ(p0 . . . pi+1) is added to S.
If pi+1 is d-faulty, then there are at most m + d + b − 1 values different from σ(p0 . . . pi+1) in
{σp(p0 . . . pi+1pi+2) : pi+2 ∈ P\pi+1}. Since n−m− b− 1 > m+ d+ b− 1, only σ(p0 . . . pi+1) might
be added to S.
Now consider pi. If pi is correct, then all correct processes will contribute a value σ(p0 . . . pi) to S. So
there are at least n−1−m− b values equal to σ(p0 . . . pi) in S and at most b values in S different from
σ(p0 . . . pi) (contributed by b Byzantine processes). If m 6= 0, then n > 2m+ d+ 2b > m+ 1 + d+ 2b.
If m = 0 but b 6= 0, then n > 3b > m + 1 + d + 2b. So n − 1 −m − b is always greater than b, the
majority value of S is σ(p0 . . . pi), i.e. LM3(σp) = σ(p0 . . . pi).
If pi is d-faulty, then all correct processes except the ones that receive wrong values from pi will
contribute a value σ(p0 . . . pi) to S. So there are at least n −m − d − b values equal to σ(p0 . . . pi) in
S, and at most d+ b values different from σ(p0 . . . pi) in S. Since n > m+ 2d+ 2b, the majority value
of S is still σ(p0 . . . pi), i.e. LM3(σ
p0...pi
p ) = σ(p0 . . . pi).
‡. We discuss how to reduce that number of rounds in Section 5Time Optimalitysection.5.
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Figure 1. High-level view of Algorithm BA++
Algorithm 1: 3-round Local-Majority (LM3)
Assume: σp is a k-round view of process p for a (n, m, d, b)-system with k > 3 and transmitter p0.
Code for p:
For every string p0p1 . . . pi and string s with 0 6 |s| 6 k − 3− i:
1) p initializes an empty multiset S.
2) For every process pi+1 ∈ P\pi, if at least n−m− b− 1 elements of
{σp0p1...pisp (pipi+1pi+2) : pi+2 ∈ P\pi+1} have the same value v, p adds v to S.
3) If more than half of S have the same value v′, then p sets LM3(σ
p0p1...pi
sp ) to v′. Otherwise p
sets LM3(σ
p0p1...pi
sp ) to ⊥.
Algorithm 2: View-Transform V T p with respect to LM3
Assume: σp is a k-round view of process p for a (n, m, d, b)-system with k > 3 and transmitter p0.
LM3 is Algorithm 1The Byzantine Agreement Protocolalgocfline.1.
Code for p:
Loop from i = k − 3 to i = 0: (denote the following ith iteration as transform V T pi .)
1) Let σ′p be a copy of σp.
2) p changes σ′p(p0p1 . . . pis) to be LM3(σ
p0p1...pi
sp ) for every p1 . . . pi and every string s with
0 6 |s| 6 k − 3− i.
3) Let σp = σ′p. (σ′p is the output of V T
p
i .)
After the loop, p outputs the first (k − 2)-round view of σp.
Algorithm 3: BA++ with respect to LM3
Assume: σp is a (b+ 3)-round view of process p for a (n, m, d, b)-system and transmitter p0. V T p
is Algorithm 2The Byzantine Agreement Protocolalgocfline.2.
Code for p:
1. Let σ′p = V T p(σp) with respect to LM3.
2. Then p outputs OM(σ′p). Here OM is the Byzantine agreement algorithm in [1].
We show that the output of View-Transform for different processes actually comes from a single scenario
of a (n, 0, 0, b)-system for which the OM algorithm guarantees Byzantine agreement in (b+ 1) rounds.
We prove this by introducing the following Scenario-Transform.
Assume: σ is a k-round scenario for a (n, m, d, b)-system with k > 3 and transmitter p0. Let B = B(σ)
be the set of Byzantine processes. V T pi is the i-th iteration in Algorithm 2The Byzantine Agreement
Protocolalgocfline.2.
Transform:
Loop from i = k − 3 to i = 0: (denote the following ith iteration as transform STi)
1) Let σ′ be a copy of σ.
2) For each p 6∈ B, apply V T pi to σ′, i.e. σ′(p0 . . . pisp) = V T pi (σp)(p0 . . . pis) for every
s ∈ P 0:k−i−1. (This Line makes sense because view transforms are independent for different
processes.)
3) For every p 6∈ B, q ∈ B, s ∈ P 0:k−i−2, set σ′(p0 . . . pispq) to σ′(p0 . . . pisp).
4) Let σ = σ′.
After the loop, output σ.
Figure 2: Scenario-Transform (ST) with respect to LM3
Lemma 2. Consider a k-round scenario σ for a (n, m, d, b)-system with k > 3 and transmitter p0.
The output scenario of Scenario-Transform (Figure 2The Byzantine Agreement Protocolfigure.2) is a
scenario of a (n, 0, 0, b)-system. Moreover, this output scenario satisfies (ST (σ))p = V T p(σp) for any
non-Byzantine process p. If p0 is a non-Byzantine transmitter for σ, then p0 is a correct transmitter for
ST (σ) such that ST (σ)(p0) = σ(p0).
Proof. For a non-Byzantine process p, (ST (σ))p = V T p(σp) follows immediately from Line 2 which
uses V T pi as in algorithm V T
p. We now prove that the output scenario is a scenario of a (n, 0, 0,
b)-system.
Let ith-σ be the scenario just after the ith loop iteration inside ST . We prove by induction this claim:
if i 6 v 6 k − 3, then ith-σ(p0 . . . pvpv+1) = ith-σ(p0 . . . pv) for every non-Byzantine process pv. Note
that if pv+1 ∈ B, the claim follows by Line 3 of ST . Thus we only need to prove the claim for the case
pv+1 is non-Byzantine.
First consider i = k−3. In this case, v could only be k−3. Suppose pk−3 and pk−2 are non-Byzantine.
Then (k − 3)th-σ(p0 . . . pk−3pk−2) = V T pk−2k−3 (σpk−2)(p0 . . . pk−3). According to Line 2 of V T pk−2k−3 ,
V T
pk−2
k−3 (σpk−2)(p0 . . . pk−3) = LM3(σ
p0...pk−3
pk−2 ). Since pk−3 6∈ B, by Lemma 1lemma.1 LM3(σp0...pk−3pk−2 ) =
σp0...pk−3(pk−3) = σ(p0 . . . pk−3). Since (k − 3)th-σ(p0 . . . pk−3) = σ(p0 . . . pk−3), the claim for k − 3
is proved.
Now suppose the claim is true for i + 1. Let us prove it for i. We need to show the claim for all
i 6 v 6 k − j. First, consider v = i and suppose pi and pi+1 are non-Byzantine. Then according to
Line 2 of V T pi+1i , ith-σ(p0 . . . pipi+1) = LM3 ((i+ 1)th-σ
p0...pi
pi+1 ). Since pi is non-Byzantine, according
to Lemma 1lemma.1, LM3 ((i+ 1)th-σ
p0...pi
pi+1 ) = (i + 1)th-σp0...pi(pi) = (i + 1)th-σ(p0 . . . pi). Hence,
ith-σ(p0 . . . pipi+1) = (i + 1)th-σ(p0 . . . pi). Because the value for p0 . . . pi is not changed in the ith
loop of ST , ith-σ(p0 . . . pi) = (i + 1)th-σ(p0 . . . pi). Thus ith-σ(p0 . . . pi) = ith-σ(p0 . . . pipi+1), the
claim is true for v = i. Now consider v > i. According to V T pv+1i and V T
pv
i , ith-σ(p0 . . . pvpv+1) =
LM3 ((i+ 1)th-σ
p0...pi
pi+1...pv+1) and ith-σ(p0 . . . pv) = LM3 ((i+ 1)th-σ
p0...pi
pi+1...pv). Since pv is correct and
v > i, by induction hypothesis (i + 1)th-σp0...pipi+1...pv+1 is equal to (i + 1)th-σ
p0...pi
pi+1...pv . Therefore ith-
σ(p0 . . . pvpv+1) = ith-σ(p0 . . . pv), and the claim is proved.
From the claim, we see that in ST (σ) every non-Byzantine process always sends correct messages to
other processes. So ST (σ) is a scenario of (n, 0, 0, b)-system with Byzantine processes B(σ). Therefore,
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if p0 is non-Byzantine in σ then p0 is also correct in ST (σ). Because the value of σ(p0) for non-Byzantine
process p0 is never changed in ST , ST (σ)(p0) = σ(p0).
With all the lemmas above, now we can give a proof of Theorem 1theorem.1.
Proof of Theorem 1theorem.1. Suppose σ is a (b+3)-round scenario for (n, m, d, b)-system. By Lemma
2lemma.2 above, σ′ = ST (σ) with respect to LM3 is a (b + 1)-round scenario of (n, 0, 0, d)-system.
Since V T p(σp) = σ′p for every non-Byzantine process p, OM(V T p(σp)) are equal for all non-Byzantine
process which proves the agreement property. Moreover, if p0 is non-Byzantine, then OM(V T p(σp)) =
ST (σ)(p0). This shows the validity property. Therefore, the theorem is proved.
4. Resilience Lower Bounds
We show here that our BA++ algorithm is optimal with respect to resilience; namely, n > max{2m+
d, 2d + m, b} + 2b is a tight bound to reach Byzantine agreement. If m = d = 0, this bound is n > 3b
which is tight by [1]. So in this section, we assume that m, d > 0 and show that it is impossible to
achieve Byzantine agreement if n 6 2m+ d+ 2b or n 6 2d+m+ 2b.
Lemma 3. If n 6 2m+ d+ 2b, then there is no Byzantine agreement algorithm in a (n, m, d, b)-system.
Proof. Consider a Byzantine agreement algorithm F for a (n, m, d, b)-system. Since n 6 2m+d+2b, P
can be partitioned into five non-empty sets G, H , I , J and K, with |G| 6 m, |H| 6 m, |I| 6 b, |J | 6 b,
|K| 6 d. Select an arbitrary process in G as transmitter p0. We define scenarios α and β recursively as
follows:
i. For every p ∈ P , k ∈ K, q ∈ P\K, let
α(p0) = 0, α(p0p) = 0,
β(p0) = 1, β(p0k) = 0, β(p0q) = 1,
ii. For every g ∈ G, h ∈ H , i ∈ I , j ∈ J , k ∈ K, p ∈ P , q ∈ P\K, w ∈ p0P ∗, define the following
values recursively on the length of w:
α(wgp) = α(wg), α(wip) = α(wi), α(wkp) = α(wk),
β(whp) = β(wh), β(wjp) = β(wj), β(wkp) = β(wp),
α(whk) = β(whk), α(whq) = α(wh), α(wjp) = β(wjp),
β(wgk) = α(wgk), β(wgq) = β(wg), β(wip) = α(wip).
It is easy to check that α is a scenario of a (n,m,d,b)-system with d-faulty processes in H and Byzantine
processes in J , and that β is a scenario of a (n,m,d,b)-system with d-faulty processes in G and Byzantine
processes in I .
In the construction, αk = βk for all k ∈ K. Thus, F (αk) = F (βk) for all k ∈ K. Since p0 is a
non-Byzantine process in both α and β, according to Byzantine agreement we have
F (αk) = α(p0) = 0,
F (βk) = β(p0) = 1.
However, it is a contradiction to that F (αk) = F (βk) for all k ∈ K. The lemma is proved.
Lemma 4. If n 6 2d+m+ 2b, then there is no Byzantine agreement algorithm in a (n, m, d, b)-system.
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The proof for Lemma 4lemma.4 is similar to the proof of Lemma 3lemma.3. Due to space limitation,
we defer the proof to Appendix IAppendix 4.Proof of Lemma 4lemma.4section*.3.
Taking together the algorithm in Section 3The Byzantine Agreement Protocolsection.3 and the lemmas
above, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Byzantine agreement can be solved in a (n, m, d, b)-system if and only if n > max{2m+
d, 2d+m, b}+ 2b.
Signed messages
So far we have assumed oral message. We now discuss the case where processes could send signed
messages [1]. In this case, we also have a tight bound on the number of processes for reaching Byzantine
agreement. Following [1], a signed message satisfies the following two properties:
1) The signature of a non-Byzantine process cannot be forged and any alteration of its content can be
detected.
2) Every process can verify the authenticity of a signature.
Formally, suppose σ is a k-round scenario for a (n, m, d, b)-system with signed messages. Let
σ(p0p1 . . . pip) (i < k) be a message received by process p. If process pj (j 6 i) is non-Byzantine,
then either σ(p0 . . . pip) = σ(p0 . . . pj), or the signature of pj is forged.
Algorithm 4: Algorithm SBA++
Assume: σp is a (b+ 2)-round view of process p for a (n, m, d, b)-system with signed messages,
and p0 is the transmitter.
Code for p:
1. p initializes an empty set S.
2. For every string p0 . . . pi (0 6 i 6 b+ 1, and p0, . . . , pi are different processes): if the signatures
attached to value σp(p0 . . . pi) are correct, then p adds σ(p0p1 . . . pi) into S.
3. p outputs the majority value of S.
We present an algorithm called SBA++ (Algorithm 4Signed messagesalgocf.4) for solving Byzantine
agreement with signed message. Due to space limitation, we move the proof of Algorithm SBA++ and the
following theorem into Appendix IIAppendix 4.Byzantine Agreement with Signed Messagessection*.4.
Theorem 3. Byzantine agreement can be solved for a (n, m, d, b)-system with signed messages if and
only if n > m+ d+ b.
5. Time Optimality
In this section, we investigate the time complexity of reaching Byzantine agreement for a (n, m, d,
b)-system. If m = 0, the communication rounds needed to reach Byzantine agreement is b+ 1 by [18].
So in this section, we assume m > 0. We show that in some cases (n > max{2m+ 2d, b+ 1}+ 2b) the
lower bound of the number of rounds for reaching Byzantine agreement is b+ 2, and in other cases (e.g.
b = 0) the lower bound is b+ 3.
We first show that a (b + 2)-round algorithm is available if n > max{2m + 2d, b + 1} + 2b. In this
case we have the following 2-round Local-Majority algorithm.
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Algorithm 5: 2-round Local-Majority (LM2)
Assume: σp is a k-round view of process p for a (n, m, d, b)-system with k > 3 and p0 is the
transmitter.
Code for p:
For every string p0p1 . . . pi and string s with 0 6 |s| 6 k − 3− i:
1) If more than half of {σp0p1...pisp (pipi+1) : pi+1 ∈ P\pi} have the same value v, then p sets
LM2(σ
p0p1...pi
sp ) to v. Otherwise p sets LM2(σ
p0p1...pi
sp ) to ⊥.
Lemma 5. Suppose n > 2m+ 2d+ 2b and n > 2b+ 1. In LM2 (Algorithm 5Time Optimalityalgocf.5),
if σp0p1...pisp (pipi+1) = σ
p0p1...pi
s′p′ (pipi+1) for all pi+1, then LM2(σ
p0p1...pi
sp ) = LM2(σ
p0p1...pi
s′p′ ). If pi is
non-Byzantine, then LM2(σ
p0p1...pi
p ) = σ(p0p1 . . . pi).
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows directly from the algorithm. So we only need to show the
second part.
If pi is correct, then in {σp(p0 . . . pi+1) : pi+1 ∈ P\pi} there are at least n− 1−m− b values equal
to σ(p0 . . . pi) and at most m+ b values different from σ(p0 . . . pi) of which b values are contributed by
B(σ) and m values are contributed by D(σ). If m = d = 0, then n > 2b+ 1 = 2m+ 2b+ 1. If m 6= 0
and d 6= 0, then n > 2m+ 2d+ 2b > 2m+ 2b+ 1. So n is always greater than m+ 2b+ 1, the majority
values of {σp(p0 . . . pi+1) : pi+1 ∈ P\pi} are equal to σ(p0 . . . pi), i.e. LM2(σp0p1...pip ) = σ(p0p1 . . . pi).
If pi is d-faulty, then in {σp(p0 . . . pi+1) : pi+1 ∈ P\pi} there are at least n−m−d−b values equal to
σ(p0 . . . pi) and at most m−1+d+b values different from σ(p0 . . . pi) of which b values are contributed
by B(σ) and m − 1 + d values are contributed by D(σ). Since n > 2m + 2d + 2b, we have n − 1 >
2(m− 1 + d+ b), the majority values are equal to σ(p0 . . . pi), i.e. LM2(σp0p1...pip ) = σ(p0p1 . . . pi).
Lemma 6. If n > max{2m+ 2d, b+ 1}+ 2b, then Byzantine agreement can be solved in b+ 2 rounds
for a (n, m, d, b)-system.
Proof. Section 3The Byzantine Agreement Protocolsection.3 uses 3-round algorithm LM3 (Algorithm
1The Byzantine Agreement Protocolalgocfline.1) to implement the sub-algorithm View-Transform (Algo-
rithm 2The Byzantine Agreement Protocolalgocfline.2), and then get a (b+3)-round Byzantine agreement
algorithm. When n > max{2m + 2d, b + 1} + 2b, we have a 2-round Local-Majority algorithm LM2.
Thus if we replace LM3 with LM2, we obtain a (b+ 2)-round Byzantine agreement algorithm.
In the following, we prove that b+2 is also a lower bound of rounds for reaching Byzantine agreement.
Specially, b+ 2 is a tight bound for the case n > max{2m+ 2d, b+ 1}+ 2b.
Theorem 4. Byzantine agreement for a (n, m, d, b)-system (m, d > 0) requires at least b+ 2 rounds.
Proof. Suppose in contrary that there is a (b+1)-round Byzantine agreement algorithm F . For any string
w, we use w¯ to denote the number corresponding to w with radix n.
Select an arbitrarily process p0 in the system as a fixed transmitter. For 0 6 x 6 nb+1 + 1, define
αx : p0P
0:b → {0, 1} as
forw ∈ p0P 0:b, αx(w) =
{
0 if w < x,
1 otherwise.
It is easy to see that α0(w) is always equal to 1, so F (α0) = 1. For the same reason, F (αnb+1+1) = 0. We
claim: αx and αx+1 are views derived from a same scenario for all 1 6 x 6 nb+1. If so, by the agreement
property of F we have F (αx) = F (αx+1). Then, we have F (α0) = F (α1) = . . . = F (αnb+1+1). This is
a contradiction to F (α0) = 1 and F (αnb+1+1) = 0. Now it remains to prove the claim.
For 1 6 x 6 nb+1, let x = q0q1 . . . qb. Since n > b+3, there exists two different processes qb+1 and qb+2
(assume qb+1 > qb+2 without loss of generality) in P\{q0 . . . qb}. Define a function σ : p0P 0:b+1 → {0, 1}
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as
forw ∈ p0P 0:b+1, σ(w) =

0 if p0 < q0,
0 if p0 = q0 andw = q0 . . . qiqs,with 0 6 i 6 b, q < qi+1,
1 otherwise.
It is easy to check that σqb+1 = αx and σqb+2 = αx+1. If p0 < q0, then σ(w) is always equal to 0.
So αx and αx+1 come from an admissible scenario σ. If p0 > q0, for the similar reason the claim is
correct. If q0 = p0, then for every process p in P\{q0, . . . , qb} we always have σ(wpq) = σ(wp). If
the set {q0, . . . , qb} has less than b elements, then let B(σ) = {q0, . . . , qb} and σ is a (b + 1)-round
scenario. Thus αx and αx+1 come from an admissible scenario σ. If the set {q0, . . . , qb} has b + 1
different elements, then let φ be as follows:
forw ∈ p0P 0:b+1, φ(w) =
{
1 if w = q0 . . . qbqwith q < qb+1 and q 6= qb+2,
σ(w) otherwise.
φ is a (b+ 1)-round scenario with Byzantine processes {q0, . . . , qb−1} and d-faulty processes {qb}. Also
we have φqb+1 = σqb+1 = αx and φqb+2 = σqb+2 = αx+1. Thus αx and αx+1 come from an admissible
scenario φ. Hence, the claim we mentioned is always correct. So the theorem follows.
Now we show that b+ 3 could be lower bound in certain cases. Specifically, suppose b = 0, we prove
that 3 rounds is a lower bound.
Lemma 7. Suppose m, d > 0 and max{2m + d, 2d + m} < n < 2m + 2d, then there is no 2-round
Byzantine agreement algorithm for a (n, m, d, 0)-system.
Proof. Let F be a 2-round Byzantine agreement algorithm. Select an arbitrarily process p0 in P as
transmitter. By the assumption of the lemma, P\p0 can be partitioned into four sets G, H , I and J such
that |G| 6 m − 1, |H| 6 m − 1, 0 < |I| 6 d, 0 < |J | 6 d. We define two 2-round scenarios α (with
d-faulty processes in G ∪ {p0}) and β (with d-faulty processes in H ∪ {p0}) as follows.
i. For every i ∈ I , j ∈ J , qi ∈ P\I , qj ∈ P\J let
α(p0) = 0, α(p0i) = 1, α(p0qi) = α(p0),
β(p0) = 1, β(p0j) = 0, β(p0qj) = β(p0),
ii. For every g ∈ G, h ∈ H , i ∈ I , qg ∈ P\(G ∪ {p0}), qh ∈ P\(H ∪ {p0}), qi ∈ P\I , p ∈ P let
α(p0p0i) = β(p0p0i) = 1,
α(p0gi) = 1, α(p0gqi) = α(p0g), α(p0qgp) = α(p0qg),
β(p0hi) = 0, β(p0hqi) = β(p0h), β(p0qhp) = β(p0qh).
In the construction, αi = βi for all i ∈ I . Thus for any i ∈ I ,
0 = α(p0) = F (αi) = F (βi) = β(p0) = 1,
giving a contradiction.
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6. Concluding Remarks
There have been several attempts to overcome the need for three-times redundancy in Byzantine
agreement [20–24]. Several researchers considered stronger communication models such as broadcast
channels. In the synchronous setting, Rabin and Ben-Or [20] introduced the notion of global broadcast
channel and showed that any multiparty computation could be achieved with two-times redundancy only.
A partial broadcast channel was defined by Fitzi and Maurer [21], and corresponding lower bounds
for reaching Byzantine agreement were presented in [22–24]. Problems of secure communication and
computation in the presence of a Byzantine adversary within an [3,25] incomplete network have also
been studied [3,25].
Accounting for the fact that communication failures sometimes dominate computation ones (due
to the high reliability of hardware and operating systems), some models focused on communication
failures [26,27] or hybrid failures [12,28]. These include models where the Byzantine components are
the communication channels instead of (or in addition to) the processes. For instance, in [14,29], Santoro
and Widmayer showed that agreement cannot be achieved with
⌈
n−1
2
⌉
Byzantine communication faults.
Our Theorem 2theorem.2 generalizes this result. Actually in Theorem 2theorem.2, taking m =
⌈
n−1
2
⌉
,
d = 1 and b = 0 would force n < 2m+ d+ b, which implies the impossibility of Byzantine agreement.
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Appendix I. Proof of Lemma 4lemma.4
Proof. Consider a Byzantine agreement algorithm F for a (n, m, d, b)-system. Since n 6 2d+m+2b, P
can be partitioned into five non-empty sets G, H , I , J and K, with |G| 6 m, |H| 6 d, |I| 6 d, |J | 6 b,
|K| 6 b. Select an arbitrarily process in G as transmitter p0. We define scenarios α and β recursively as
follows:
i. For every h ∈ H , i ∈ I , qα ∈ P\H , qβ ∈ P\I let
α(p0) = 0, α(p0h) = 1, α(p0qα) = 0,
β(p0) = 1, β(p0i) = 0, β(p0qβ) = 1,
ii. For every g ∈ G, h ∈ H , i ∈ I , j ∈ J , k ∈ K, p ∈ P , qα ∈ P\H , qβ ∈ P\I , w ∈ p0P ∗, define the
following values recursively on the length of w:
α(whp) = α(wg), α(wip) = α(wi), α(wkp) = α(wk),
β(whp) = β(wh), β(wip) = β(wi), β(wjp) = β(wj),
α(wgqα) = α(wg), α(wgh) = β(wg), α(wjp) = β(wjp),
β(wgqβ) = β(wg), β(wgi) = α(wg), β(wkp) = α(wkp).
It is easy to check that α is a scenario of a (n,m,d,b)-system with d-faulty processes in G and Byzantine
processes in J , and that β is a scenario of a (n,m,d,b)-system with d-faulty processes in G and Byzantine
processes in K.
In the construction, αh = βh and αi = βi for all h ∈ H and i ∈ I . Thus for any h ∈ H ,
0 = α(p0) = F (αh) = F (βh) = β(p0) = 1,
giving a contradiction.
Appendix II. Byzantine Agreement with Signed Messages
We consider that processes send signed messages. Following [1], a signed message satisfies the
following two properties:
1) A non-Byzantine process’s signature cannot be forged and any alteration of the content of its signed
messages can be detected.
2) Any process can verify the authenticity of a process’s signature.
Formally, suppose σ is a k-round scenario for a (n, m, d, b)-system with signed messages. Let σ(p0p1 . . . pip)
(i < k) be a message received by process p. If process pj (j 6 i) is non-Byzantine, then either
1. σ(p0 . . . pip) = σ(p0 . . . pj), or
2. the signature of pj is forged.
In this new setting, we have the following main result:
Theorem 5. Byzantine agreement can be solved for a (n, m, d, b)-system with signed messages if and
only if n > m+ d+ b.
Lemma 8. SBA++ (Algorithm 6Appendix II. Byzantine Agreement with Signed Messagesalgocf.6) solves
Byzantine agreement for a (n, m, d, b)-system with signed messages if n > m+ d+ b.
Proof. First suppose the transmitter p0 is non-Byzantine. By definition of a signed message, every message
σp(p0 . . . pi) (i 6 b + 1) is either equal to σ(p0), or is detected as forged message. So set S contains
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Algorithm 6: Algorithm SBA++
Assume: σp is a (b+ 2)-round view of process p for a (n, m, d, b)-system with signed messages,
and p0 is the transmitter.
Code for p:
1. p initializes an empty set S.
2. For every string p0 . . . pi (0 6 i 6 b+ 1, and p0, . . . , pi are different processes): if the signatures
attached to value σp(p0 . . . pi) are correct, then p adds σ(p0p1 . . . pi) into S.
3. p outputs the majority value of S.
at most σ(p0). If p0 is correct, then σp(p0) = σ(p0) and σ(p0) is added into S. If p0 is d-faulty, then
there must be at least one correct process such that σ(p0q) = σ(p0) since n > m + d + b. And then
we have σ(p0qp) = σ(p0q) = σ(p0). According to Line 2 of SBA++, σp(p0q) = σ(p0) is added into S.
Therefore, S contains a single value σ(p0). Consequently, if p is non-Byzantine, p outputs σ(p0).
Now assume the transmitter p0 is Byzantine. Let Sp and Sp′ be the corresponding set S initiated by
p and p′ in Line 1 of SBA++. We show that Sp = Sp′ for any two non-Byzantine processes p and p′.
Suppose σp(p0 . . . pk) is included in Sp. Let pl (l 6 k) be the non-Byzantine process in p0 . . . pk with
the smallest subscript. Then all processes in p0 . . . pl−1 are Byzantine, which implies l 6 b. Since the
signatures attached to σp(p0 . . . pk) are correct, σ(p0 . . . pl) = σp(p0 . . . pk). Since n − m − b > d, pl
sends σ(p0 . . . pl) to at least one correct process q. Then σp′(p0 . . . plq) is equal to σ(p0 . . . pl). According
to Line 2 of SBA++, σp′(p0 . . . plq) = σ(p0 . . . pl) = σp(p0 . . . pk) is added into Sp′ . Therefore, we have
Sp ⊂ Sp′ . Since p and p′ are two arbitrary non-Byzantine process, we also have Sp′ ⊂ Sp. That is to say
Sp = Sp′ . According to Line 3 of SBA++, all non-Byzantine processes output a same value.
Proof of Theorem 5theorem.5. From the lemma above, we know that if n > m + d + b then Byzantine
agreement is solvable. Now we show that if n 6 m+ d+ b then Byzantine agreement is impossible.
Suppose by contradiction that F is a Byzantine agreement algorithm for a (n, m, d, b)-system with
signed messages and n 6 m + d + b. We separate the processes into three sets G, H and I such that
|G| 6 m, |H| 6 b, |I| 6 d. Select an arbitrarily process in G as transmitter p0. We define the scenarios
α and β (both with Byzantine processes in H and d-faulty processes in G) recursively as follows:
i. For every i ∈ I , q ∈ P\I let
α(p0) = 0, α(p0i) = ⊥, α(p0q) = α(p0),
β(p0) = 1, β(p0i) = ⊥, β(p0q) = β(p0).
ii. For every g ∈ G, h ∈ H , i ∈ I , p ∈ P , q ∈ P\I , w ∈ p0P ∗, define the following values recursively
on the length of w:
α(wgi) = β(wgi) = ⊥, α(wgq) = α(wg), β(wgq) = β(wg),
α(whp) = α(wip) = β(whp) = β(wip) = ⊥.
Moreover, αi = βi for all i ∈ I since αi(w) = βi(w) = ⊥ for all string w ∈ p0P ∗. Thus for any i ∈ I ,
0 = α(p0) = F (αi) = F (βi) = β(p0) = 1,
giving a contradiction.
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Appendix III. Early Decision
The work in [30,31] showed that processes could make an early decision if the number of actual
Byzantine failures is less than the maximal number of failures it can tolerate. We show here how we can
achieve early decision with partial Byzantine failures.
Theorem 6. Consider a (n, m, d, b)-system (m, d > 0) and f denotes the number of actual Byzantine
processes during an execution. Then Byzantine agreement can be solved in the following number of
rounds:
• min{2(f + 2), 2(d+ 1)}, if n > max{2m+ 2d, b+ 1}+ 2b,
• min{3(f + 2), 3(d+ 1)}, if n > max{2m+ d, 2d+m, b}+ 2b.
Proof. First consider n > max{2m + d, 2d + m, b} + 2b. From Lemma 1lemma.1, for any scenario σ
we have LM3(σ
p0
p ) = σ(p0) provided that p0 is non-Byzantine. By definition σ
p0
p = σp, so we have
LM3(σp) = σ(p0). This means every non-Byzantine process could get the initial value of the non-
Byzantine transmitter p0 despite that p0 might be partial faulty. Thus by applying LM3 to a 3-round
scenario σ, we could obtain a 3-round reliable broadcast algorithm. If we use this reliable broadcast
algorithm as a broadcast primitive in the early deciding algorithms in [30,31], then we could get early
deciding Byzantine agreement for a (n, m, d, b)-system as well. The time complexity of algorithms in
[30,31] is min{f + 2, b + 1}. Since we replace one round broadcast with three rounds broadcast, the
time complexity of early deciding algorithm with 3-round reliable broadcast is min{3(f + 2), 3(b+ 1)}.
The result for n > max{2m+ 2d, b+ 1}+ 2b follows from the same idea.
Appendix IV. The Eventually Synchronous Case
We considered so far synchronous computations. However, it is also possible to tolerate partial failures
in eventually synchronous systems. In this section, we first present a reliable broadcast implementation
that tolerates partial Byzantine failures. Here, reliable broadcast ensures that if a non-Byzantine process
broadcasts a message then other processes will receive the same message eventually (no such guarantee
for Byzantine processes). This broadcast primitive thus can be plugged into an algorithm like [32].
We assume here that after an unknown but finite time the system become synchronous [19]. Within
an eventually synchronous system, the processes could not distinguish message delay from the absence
of a message. We consider a static (n, m, d, b)-system which includes up to b Byzantine processes and
up to m partial faulty processes each of which is associated with up to d fixed Byzantine links. We first
show that the algorithm LM2 and LM3 can be modified to achieve reliable broadcast in an eventually
synchronous (n, m, d, b)-system.
Algorithm 7: 2-round Reliable-Broadcast (RB2)
Assume: σp is a 2-round view of process p for a static (n, m, d, b)-system with k > 2 and p0 is the
transmitter.
Code for p:
1. Waits until receiving more than n−m− d− b values for {σp(p0p1) : p1 ∈ P\p0} with a same
value v, then output v.
Lemma 9. In RB2 (Algorithm 7Appendix IV. The Eventually Synchronous Casealgocf.7), if n > 2m +
2d+ 2b and p0 is non-Byzantine, then RB2(σp) = σ(p0).
Proof. As in Lemma 5lemma.5, p0 will receive n − m − d − b σp(p0p1) that equal to σ(p0) from
n−m− d− b correct processes. Since 2(n−m− d− b) > n− 1, the lemma follows.
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Algorithm 8: 3-round Reliable-Broadcast (RB3)
Assume: σp is a 3-round view of process p for a static (n, m, d, b)-system with k > 3 and p0 is the
transmitter.
Code for p:
1. p initializes an empty set S.
2. Waits until receiving n−m− b− 1 values for {σp(p0p1p2) : p2 ∈ P\p1} with a same value v,
then p adds v to S.
3. Waits until n−m− d− b values in S have a same value v′, then p outputs v′.
Lemma 10. In RB3 (Algorithm 8Appendix IV. The Eventually Synchronous Casealgocf.8), if n >
max{2m+ d, 2d+m, b}+ 2b and p0 is non-Byzantine, then RB3(σp) = σ(p0).
Proof. If p1 is correct, there are at least n−m−b−1 values equal to σ(p0p1) in {σp(p0p1p2) : p2 ∈ P\p1}
from correct processes, which implies σ(p0p1) will be added to S eventually.
If p1 is d-faulty, there are at most m + d + b − 1 values different from σ(p0p1) in {σp(p0p1p2) :
p2 ∈ P\p1}. Since n−m− b− 1 > m+ d+ b− 1, only σ(p0p1) might be added to S.
Now consider the transmitter. If p0 is non-Byzantine, all correct processes except the one receiving
wrong values from p0 will contribute a value σ(p0) to S. So S will eventually include at least n−m−d−b
values equal to σ(p0) and at most d+ b values different from σ(p0). Since n > m+ 2d+ 2b, RB3(σp)
can only be σ(p0).
If RB2 or RB3 is employed as a broadcast primitive, i.e. a process broadcasts a message by executing
an instance of RB2 or RB3, then the messages broadcast by non-Byzantine processes will be received
by other non-Byzantine processes as if there are no partial failures. In this way, RB2 and RB3 could
play the role of reliable broadcast for a (n, m, d, b)-system. We could then use our reliable broadcast
primitive (either RB2 or RB3) within an algorithm such as PBFT [32]. We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Byzantine agreement can be solved assuming eventually synchronous computation of a static
(n, m, d, b)-system (m, d > 0) if and only if n > max{2m+ d, 2d+m, b}+ 2b.
Proof. The sufficiency follows from the above discussion. The necessity comes from Lemma 3lemma.3
and Lemma 4lemma.4.
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